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The State of the Onion: Peeling Back the Layers of
America's Ambivalence Toward Judicial Independence
CHARLES GARDNER GEYH*
One hundred years ago Roscoe Pound addressed the American Bar Association on
the sources of dissatisfaction with the administration ofjustice.' Among the sources of
dissatisfaction that Pound identified in his speech was one he characterized as inherent
in any legal system: popular impatience with restraint. As he explained:
Law involves restraint and regulation, with the sheriff and his posse in the
background to enforce it. But, however necessary and salutary this restraint, men
have never been reconciled to it entirely. The very fact that it is a compromise
between the individual and his fellows makes the individual, who must abate some
part of his activities in the interest of his fellows, more or less restive.
2
If the public is predisposed to resent litigation outcomes that impose unwelcome
restraints, it begs the question of whether the public really wants an independent
judiciary in the first place, or would prefer judges who are subject to popular control
and will render the decisions that the public favors. The question of whether the public
really wants an independent judiciary has two parts: What is an independentjudiciary?
And does the public want one? The first part seemingly invites a protracted disquisition
on the meaning ofjudicial independence, but that would be unnecessarily digressive.
For purposes here, it will suffice to isolate, from the many facets of judicial
independence that scholars have identified, those of central relevance to the public
judicial independence debate. With those meanings in hand, I will then turn to the
second part of the question and peel back the layers of the public's views on judicial
independence, like an onion, to reveal the nature and extent of the public's
ambivalence.
I. WHAT IS JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE?
Chief Justice William Rehnquist once likened judicial independence to "crown
jewels., 3 His point: judicial independence is precious and intrinsically valuable-a
sentiment that many court defenders express when responding to court critics in the
media. The analogy to jewels likewise underscores the multifaceted character of
judicial independence. Scholars, judges, and bar organizations have sought to cut the
judicial independence stone in myriad ways.4 In the context of a thought piece on
whether the public supports judicial independence, these varied stabs at
conceptualizing judicial independence are germane only insofar as they intersect with
issues that have animated public concern. The key is to isolate which are most relevant
to the public's conception ofjudicial independence.
* John F. Kimberling Chair in Law, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington.
1. Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of
Justice, 29 REP. A.B.A. 395 (1906).
2. Id. at 402.
3. William H. Rehnquist, Keynote Address, 46 AM. U. L. REv. 267, 274 (1996).
4. See infra notes 5-20 and accompanying text.
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A. Decisional and Institutional Independence
One widely employed means to conceptualize judicial independence has been to
differentiate between judges as individual decision makers and judges collectively as a
branch. 5 "Decisional independence" relates to an individual judge's capacity to make
decisions without external interference, while "institutional independence" relates to
the judges' collective capacity as a branch to regulate themselves without institutional
encroachment from the other branches of government.6 Thus, efforts to coerce a judge
into deciding X case in Y way implicate her decisional independence, while legislative
attempts to micromanage the judiciary's internal administration implicate its
institutional independence.
To the extent that judicial independence is a matter of public concern, it is a matter
that has come to the public's attention in the context of specific cases: Representatives
Tom DeLay and Steve King threatening federal judges with budget cuts and
disestablishment of their offices after the Eleventh Circuit denied a petition to reinsert
Teri Schiavo's feeding tube;7 Tennessee voters ousting Justice Penny White from
office on account of her vote in a death penalty case; 8 President Clinton and
Presidential candidate Dole threatening the tenure of District Judge Harold Baer after
he suppressed evidence in a drug case 9 and the House passing legislation to strip
federal courts ofjurisdiction to hear pledge of allegiance cases after the Ninth Circuit
invalidated the "under God" clause.' 0 These are matters of "decisional independence."
Although the press occasionally reports on issues implicating institutional
independence, for example, when Chief Justices Rehnquist and Roberts have spoken
on the subject of judicial salaries and their relationship to the strength and
independence of the judiciary as a branch, such reports do not generate the same kind
of "buzz" and are largely ignored." Accordingly, when it comes to assessing public
perception, the focus needs to be on the decisional side of the equation.
5. Stephen H. Legomsky, Deportation and the War on Independence, 91 CORNELL L. REv.
369, 386 (2006) ("[I]t is common to distinguish decisional independence from institutional and
other components of judicial independence.") (emphasis omitted).
6. AM. BAR ASS'N, AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY: REPORT OF THE ABA COMMISSION ON
SEPARATION OF POWERS AND JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, at iii (1997).
7. Carl Hulse & David D. Kirkpatrick, Even Death Does Not Quiet Harsh Political Fight,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2005, at Al.
8. Stephen B. Bright, Political Attacks on the Judiciary: Can Justice Be Done amid
Efforts to Intimidate and Remove Judges from Office for Unpopular Decision?, 72 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 308, 314-15 (1997).
9. AM. BARAss'N, supra note 6, at 15-16.
10. Stephen Dinan, House Targets Judicial "Errors" with a New Strategy: Votes to Stop
Enforcement of Rulings on Pledge, Posting, WASH. TIMES, July 29, 2003, at Al.
11. See, e.g., A Judge's Pay: ChiefJustice John Roberts Echoes a Plea Made by New York
State ChiefJudge Kaye, ALBANY TIMES UNION, Jan. 9, 2006, at A6 (reporting on Chief Justice
Robert's efforts to energize public support for increasing judicial salaries, which Chief Justice
Rehnquist had concluded was like "beating a dead horse").
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B. Doctrinal, Customary, and Functional Independence
Another way to understand judicial independence that I have advocated in my
writing is with reference to the sources from which the judiciary's independence is
derived, be it constitutional text or judicial decisions ("doctrinal independence");
institutional customs, conventions, or norms that delineate what the scope of the
judiciary's autonomy should be ("customary independence"); or a lack of political
branch interference or regulation attributable to simple inaction or indifference
("functional independence").12 Thus, a federal judge's tenure during good behavior is
explicitly guaranteed by Article III of the U.S. Constitution and is thus a matter of
doctrinal independence; removing judges by impeachment for making unpopular
decisions is prohibited neither by constitutional text nor Supreme Court decision, but is
effectively barred by a tradition of respect for the judiciary's autonomy, and is thus a
matter of customary independence; and in those states that have not perceived a need to
establish intermediate appellate courts, the trial judge's freedom from control by such
courts is a matter of functional independence.
As a practical matter, doctrinal independence is at issue only infrequently;'3 most
court-curbing measures-to impeach roguejudges, slash judicial budgets, strip subject
matter jurisdiction, disestablish judicial offices, or punish judicial incumbents at the
ballot box-are within the constitutional authority of legislatures or voters to
implement. More typically, those who call court-curbing measures a threat to
independence are arguing that the measures at issue undermine less formal judicial
independence norms, i.e. customary independence, while court-curbing proponents are
saying either that the judicial independence norms at issue have perpetuated bad public
policy and should be abandoned, or that the independence at issue in a specific case is
functional only and impedes judicial accountability. At the level of debate as it plays
out in the media, such distinctions may be too subtle to attract public attention: the
issue is simply whether controlling judges in a particular way is a good idea or a bad
one. Still, whether proposals to exert greater control over judges are well received or
not may turn, at least implicitly, on whether such proposals are thought to disregard
cherished norms, abandon crumbling norms, or make a simple adjustment to the public
policy du jour.
C. Relational and Behavioral Independence
Peter Russell has distinguished between the structures that facilitate a judge's
independence in relation to others ("relational independence"), and whether the judge
does in fact behave independently of others ("behavioral independence"). 14 To
12. Charles Gardner Geyh, Customary Independence, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE
CROSSROADS 162, 162-63 (Stephen B. Burbank & Barry Friedman eds., 2002).
13. One illustrative exception is a bill introduced by Representative Mike Sodrel, which
proposed not only to strip the federal courts of jurisdiction to hear future cases challenging
prayer in state legislatures, but to disregard a judicial order, thereby arguably encroaching on
judicial power and violating the separation of powers. Bill Ruthhart, Sodrel: Prayer Measure
Fights "Judicial Activism," INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Feb. 22, 2006, at B6.
14. Peter H. Russell, Toward a General Theory of Judicial Independence, in JUDICIAL




illustrate, if a judge's continuation in office is subject to legislative whim, she lacks
relational independence, and if, because of her relational dependence on the legislature,
she makes decisions to appease the legislature, she exhibits a lack of behavioral
independence as well. One would ordinarily expect relational and behavioral
independence to go hand-in-hand, but that is not necessarily the case: some judges
may, despite relational dependence on another branch, manifest behavioral
independence by rendering decisions that disappoint the branch of government to
which they are beholden; conversely, other judges with structural autonomy may
nonetheless bend their decisions out of deference to the desires of another branch, so
displaying behavioral dependence despite relational independence.
As a general matter, in public discussion, the conceptual distinction between
relational and behavioral independence is blurred by a popular presumption that the
two are joined at the hip: relationally dependent judges will issue behaviorally
dependent rulings to appease the public or political branches to which they are
beholden, while relationally independent judges will render behaviorally independent
rulings. Thus, ifjudges are subject to impeachment and removal for ruling in particular
ways, the assumption of those who support and oppose such a measure is that judges
will stop ruling in those ways (with one side saying that is a good thing, and the other
saying it is bad). 15
Even if the distinction between relational and behavioral independence is not central
to popular conceptions ofjudicial independence, it raises an underlying question that is
prominent in the public's mind: to the extent that relational independence begets
behavioral independence, does behavioral independence beget lawlessness-judges
who abuse their independence by disregarding the law and substituting their own
personal or political preferences without fear of reprisal? If so, is the solution to
impose greater relational dependence, as a means to encourage greater behavioral
dependence and thereby give policy-makers the leverage they need to curb abuses?
These questions are at the heart of the distinction discussed below, between case and
rule independence.
D. Case and Rule Independence
Professor Kim Scheppele has drawn a normative distinction between a judge's
independence of the "case" she is to decide, and her independence of the "rule" she is
to apply.16 We want the former: judges should be "free to follow their best professional
sense of what the law requires" in every case, uninfluenced by personal bias, or
pressure from government officials or the general public.17 On the other hand, we want
judges who are accountable to and not independent of the rules they are sworn to
uphold. Professor Pamela Karlan puts a similar point in a different way, when she
distinguishes between independence from and independence to. Whereas we want
15. AM. BAR Ass'N, supra note 6, at 15 (quoting critics for proposition that impeachment
threats will serve as a deterrent); id. at 47-48 (criticizing threats of impeachment as "calculated
to interfere with... decision-making independence").
16. Kim Lane Scheppele, Declarations of Independence: Judicial Reactions to Political
Pressure, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 12, at 227, 230-31.
17. Id. at 230.
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judges who are independent from external control, we do not want judges who are
independent to disregard the law and pursue their own goals.'
8
This distinction occupies a front seat in public discussion ofjudicial independence
issues. Court defenders emphasize the need for judicial independence to insulate
judges from interference with their impartial assessment of the facts and law in
politically charged cases. 19 Conversely, court critics decry "activist"judges who are so
independent as to be unaccountable and who are thereby enabled to disregard the law
they have sworn to uphold and decide politically charged cases with reference to their
political and personal views.
20
II. Do AMERICANS SUPPORT JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE?
Roughly stated, then, judicial independence as it is commonly understood (or at
least as it is commonly described in media reports) concerns a judge's freedom from
external sources of interference with her capacity to decide cases according to her best
assessment of the law and facts, as defined and limited by our constitutional traditions.
Determining whether the public supports judicial independence, so understood,
requires us to peel back the public's reaction to judicial independence layer by layer,
like an onion, to reveal an almost bi-polar ambivalence.
A. The First Layer-Judicial Independence as a Platitude
The outermost, paper-thin layer of the judicial independence onion is a platitude.
Judicial independence is, as Chief Justice Rehnquist put it, a "crownjewel.' L. Ralph
Mecham, the Director of the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts, called it "the
cornerstone of a free society and the rule of law," 22 while American Bar Association
President Alfred P. Carlton effused: "Judicial independence is precious to our way of
life. Judicial independence is a fundamental principle upon which our country was
founded and for which Americans have died, not only at Yorktown and Valley Forge,
but at the Alamo, Iwo Jima, Inchon, Khe Sanh, and, now, Mazar-E-Sharif. ' 23 As with
democracy, rainbows, and free checking, what is not to like about judicial
independence? If it was good enough for James Madison and his fellow founders, it is
good enough for us, and to argue otherwise is almost un-American. Of course
Americans want judicial independence.
18. Pamela S. Karlan, Two Concepts of Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 535,
535-36 (1999).
19. See, e.g., AM. BAR ASs'N, supra note 6, at vi; TASK FORCES OF CITIZENS FOR INDEP.
COURTS, UNCERTAIN JUSTICE: POLITICS AND AMERICA'S COURTS 147-53 (2000).
20. See, for example, discussion quoting proponents of court-curbing measures in CHARLES
GARDNER GEYH, WHEN COURTS & CONGRESS COLLIDE: THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF
AMERICA'S JUDICIAL SYSTEM 266-73 (2006).
21. Rehnquist, supra note 3, at 274.
22. L. Ralph Mecham, Introduction to Mercer Law Review Symposium on Federal Judicial
Independence, 46 MERCER L. REv. 637, 638 (1995).
23. Alfred P. Carlton, Jr., Preserving Judicial Independence-An Exegesis, 29 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 835, 837 (2002) (footnote call numbers omitted).
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B. The Second Layer-Naked Self-Interest
Beneath the superficial platitudes lies a reflexive spasm of antipathy toward judicial
independence. When it comes to deciding whose interpretation of the Constitution will
prevail, who will go to prison, who will recover damages, and whose rights will be
vindicated, we want our side to win. We want a judiciary that will give us the outcomes
we seek, and independent judges could give us the wrong result. Therefore, we want a
judiciary that we can control. The more-rabid court critics who seek to control judges
at every turn are often accused of adopting this approach to judicial independence by
excoriating as "activist" any judge who issues rulings they dislike.24
When Roscoe Pound spoke in terms of impatience with restraint, his focus was here,
on members of the public who reflexively object to decisions with which they disagree.
In other words, in litigation there are always going to be losers and because the losers
are going to be disgruntled, there will be a level of dissatisfaction with the courts
inherent in any legal system. If the losers are angry and numerous enough, they become
a force with which to reckon, as was true of the progressives in Pound's day.
25
Similarly, today we see that 56% of the public surveyed in a poll conducted in 2005
reported their agreement with the proposition that court opinions should be in line with
voters' values and that judges who repeatedly ignored those values should be
impeached.26
C. The Third Layer-Enlightened Self-Interest
Beneath the layer of naked self-interest lies enlightened self-interest, which adopts a
more nuanced and ultimately more sympathetic view ofjudicial independence. Self-
interested litigants and court observers understand that litigation, at least at the
appellate level, is typically a zero-sum game: for every winner, there is a loser. In a
perfect world, you would prefer a winning result every time, but you are well aware
that your opponent feels likewise. If judges are subject to external intimidation or
influence, it creates an opportunity for you to finagle a favorable outcome, but it
furnishes your opponent with the same opportunity. If you cannot be certain of your
capacity to out-finagle your opponent, an independent judge--one who cannot be
controlled by either side-is clearly preferable to one who is under the thumb of your
adversary. Thus, for self-interested court observers enlightened by the realization that a
bare-knuckle brawl for political control of judicial decision making is a fight they
24. See, e.g., Tony Mauro, K Street Rough Rider: Kermit Roosevelt IlLooks at Law Firm
Life, the Courts, and Washington, LEGAL TIMES, June 26, 2006, at 38 ("When a commentator
accuses the Court of 'judicial activism' [Professor Roosevelt] said, it usually means only that
the commentator did not like the result."); Mary Alice Robbins, Bar Meeting Debate Centers on
Definition ofJudicialActivism, TEx. LAW., June 26,2006, at 5 ("'To the common man, judicial
activism refers to any decision you personally don't like."' (quoting Emily Bazelon, Senior
Editor, Slate, Whose Ox Gets Gored?, Debate at the State Bar of Texas Annual Meeting (June
16, 2006))).
25. See generally WILLIAM G. Ross, A MUTED FURY: POPULISTS, PROGREssivEs, AND LABOR
UNIONS CONFRONT THIE COURTS, 1890-1937 (1994) (discussing anti-court sentiment during the
Populist-Progressive era).
26. Martha Neil, Half of US. Sees "JudicialActivism Crisis," A.B.A. J., Sept. 30, 2005,
available at http://www.abanet.org/journal/redesign/s30survey.html.
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could as easily lose as win, an independent judiciary becomes an attractive middle
ground.
This sentiment underlying the enlightened self-interest perspective is nicely
captured in the widely used metaphor ofjudge as umpire or referee. In 1998, Justice
John Paul Stevens told a Chicago audience that:
The thousands and thousands of Cub fans who have repeatedly visited Wrigley
[Flield undoubtedly know much more about the rules of baseball and the ability of
National League umpires to apply them fairly than most voters know about the law
and the qualifications of judges of the Circuit Court of Cook County.
Nevertheless, I think you would agree that the home-team fans should not have the
opportunity to hire and fire umpires.
27
Minnesota Justice Alan Page made the same point in 2006, when commenting on the
potential for campaign contributions to undermine judicial independence: "We
wouldn't want umpires with a stated interest in the outcome of the contest., 28 In
baseball, the consummate zero-sum game, enlightened, self-interested adversaries
voluntarily subject themselves to the judgment of an independent umpire, whose
decisions they agree to respect. And the same is true, this popular argument goes, for
judges: "The first lesson we teach our children when they enter competitive sports is to
respect the referee, even if we think he might have made the wrong call," Senator
James Jeffords declared on the Senate floor in 2005, adding that "[i]f our children can
understand this, why can't our political leaders? We shouldn't be throwing rhetorical
hand grenades." 29 Consistent with this view of judge as umpire, 73% of the public
surveyed in 2005 reported their agreement with the statement that "judges should be
shielded from outside pressure and allowed to make their decisions based on their own
independent reading of the law."30 In another survey conducted that same year, 83%
felt that judges should be protected from "political interference" by Congress.3 1
D. The Fourth Layer-Skepticism of Judicial Motives
The operating assumption of those who, in the spirit of enlightened self-interest,
favor decision making by independent judges is that judges insulated from external
sources of intimidation will follow the law. As Chief Justice Roberts explained during
27. Molly McDonough, U.S. Justice No Fan of Picking Judges by Ballot, CHI. DAILY L.
BULL., Sept. 17, 1998, at 1.
28. Michael Krieger, Judiciary Post- 'White 'Discussed, LEGAL LEDGER (St. Paul, Minn.),
July 6, 2006.
29. Carl Hulse & David D. Kirkpatrick, DeLay Says Federal Judiciary Has "Run Amok,"
Adding Congress Is Partly to Blame, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2005, at A2 1.
30. CAMPBELL PUB. AFFAIRS INST., MAXWELL SCH. OF SYRACUSE UNIV., JUDGES AND THE
AMERICAN PUBLIC'S VIEW OF THEM: RESULTS OF THE MAXWELL POLL 3 (2005),
http://www.maxwell.syr.edu/news/MaxwellPoll.pdf [hereinafter MAXWELL POLL].
31. BELDEN RUSSONELLO & STEWART, ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
VERSUS POLITICAL PRESSURE: DEFINING THE BATTLE FOR THE COURTS, in JUSTICE AT STAKE
CAMPAIGN, SPEAK TO AMERICAN VALUES: A HANDBOOK FOR WINNING THE DEBATE FOR FAIR AND




his confirmation testimony with yet another baseball analogy: "Judges are like umpires.
Umpires don't make the rules; they apply them." 32 Beneath enlightened self-interest,
however, lies a layer of public skepticism, animated by the concern that independent
judges abuse their independence by disregarding the law and deciding cases on the
basis of their own personal and political views. As one editorial writer put it, "Sen.
James M. Jeffords ... wants us to respect judges just as we 'respect the referee' in
competitive sports ... [b]ut the fans would never tolerate a baseball umpire changing
the rules of the game by calling a batter out after two strikes."
33
Skeptics, then, distrust judges, and distrust breeds antipathy toward judicial
independence and desire for greater control. "Judicial independence does not equal
judicial supremacy," declared House Majority leader Tom DeLay in 2005. 34 The
judiciary has "run amok," he said, having "overstepped its authority on countless
occasions," adding that Congress must "reassert [its] constitutional authority over the
courts" to "make sure the judges administer their responsibilities. 35 Consistent with
DeLay's sentiments, a poll conducted in 2005 revealed that 56% of those surveyed
shared the view that judicial activism "seems to have reached a crisis" because "judges
routinely overrule the will of the people, invent new rights, and ignore traditional
morality." 36 Forty-six percent agreed with the statement that judges are "arrogant, out
of control, and unaccountable," as compared with only 38% that disagreed; 37 while a
2001 survey found that 76% thought the term "political" described judges "well or
very well. 38 In another survey from 2005, 56% of respondents agreed with the
statement that "judges always say that their decisions are based on the law and the
constitution but in many cases judges are really basing their decisions on their own
personal beliefs. 39
The thickness of this fourth layer of skepticism has varied with the age. Every
generation since the nation was founded has witnessed an upsurge of court-directed
hostility accompanied by calls to curb judges for issuing rulings that allegedly usurped
political power:
When the nation was barely a decade old, President Thomas Jefferson and his
cohort sought to impeach unpopular Federalist judges, whom Jeffersonians accused of
bending the law to their will.
40
A generation later, President Andrew Jackson challenged the authority of the
Marshall Court to trump executive branch interpretations of the Constitution, and
32. David G. Savage, Roberts Sees Role as Judicial "Umpire, "L.A. TIMEs, Sept. 13,2005,
at 1.
33. Phyllis Schlafly, Editorial, Liberals Rally Around Judicial Supremacy, INTELLIGENCER
(Doylestown, Pa.), Apr. 27, 2005, at 15A.
34. Hulse & Kirkpatrick, supra note 29.
35. Id.
36. Neil, supra note 26.
37. Id.
38. JUSTICE AT STAKE CAMPAIGN, NATIONAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN VOTERS 5 (2001),
available at http://faircourts.org/files/JASNationalSurveyResults.pdf (survey conducted by
Greenberg, Quinlan, Rosner Research, Inc.).
39. MAXWELL POLL, supra note 30, at 3.
40. GEYH, supra note 20, at 53-54.
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Georgia openly defied as illegitimate the authority of the U.S. Supreme Court to bind it
in habeas corpus proceedings.4'
In the aftermath of the Civil War, a radical Republican Congress threatened to
"annihilate" judges who obstructed the Reconstruction agenda, and went so far as to
strip the Supreme Court of jurisdiction to rule on the constitutionality of a piece of
Reconstruction legislation in a pending case.42
During the Progressive era at the turn of the twentieth century, legislators enacted
laws to regulate workplace hours, wages, and conditions, only to have conservative
judges declare them an unconstitutional deprivation ofbusiness's freedom to contract.
Progressives attacked these decisions as illegitimate, and proposed to end life tenure
for federal judges, establish mechanisms for recall of recalcitrant state judges,
eliminate judicial review, and retrench federal court jurisdiction.43
A generation later, President Franklin Roosevelt challenged the legitimacy of
Supreme Court decisions invalidating his New Deal programs and proposed the
infamous "Court Packing Plan," which would have enabled the President to alter the
decision-making majority of the Court with an infusion of new appointments."
Still another generation after that, the Warren Court's liberal-leaning rulings in civil
rights and liberties cases prompted calls to strip the Court ofjurisdiction and impeach
its Justices.45
In short, there is ample precedent for the proposition that Americans are
episodically suspicious of their judges. It bears emphasis, however, that while these
episodes have come, they have likewise gone, which begs the question of why.
E. At the Core-A Judicial Independence Tradition
Asjust described, cycles of anti-court sentiment, driven by a deep-seated skepticism
of independent judges and their motives, have a long and rich history. These cycles,
however, have become decreasingly productive over time. Whereas in the nineteenth
century, Congress occasionally made good on threats to impeach (though not remove)
errant judges, disestablish unpopular courts, or strip the courts ofjurisdiction to hear
cases it did not want resolved in unapproved ways, by the twentieth century, the
cyclical sound and fury had come to signify little more than cyclical sound and fury.
Many threats were made, but virtually none were executed, despite widespread anger
with judges' decisions and suspicion of their motives.46
The best explanation for this development, as I have argued elsewhere, is the
emergence and entrenchment of a judicial independence tradition over time.41 The
long-term survival ofjudicial independence in the United States cannot be explained
with reference to our State and Federal Constitutions alone, which delegate to the
political branches considerable power to undermine the judiciary's autonomy if they
were inclined to exercise it (by giving legislatures control over court budgets,
41. Id. at 55-56.
42. Id at 65-70.
43. Id. at 77-80.
44. Id at 79-80.
45. Idat 109-10.
46. Id. at 80-81, 109-11.
47. Id. at 1.
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jurisdiction, judicial impeachment, and in some cases court size and structure).48 Nor
can the longevity ofjudicial independence be attributed to the power of the platitude
(layer one), which by its very nature is an empty shell that could not survive a period of
sustained criticism. Enlightened self-interest (layer three) offers a policy-based
justification forjudicial independence that may be strong enough to win the day much
of the time, but it cannot, by itself, explain the almost complete failure of skeptics
(layer four) to gain traction during periods of intense anti-court sentiment throughout
the twentieth century. Rather, the policy-driven support for judicial independence that
inspired the founders to adopt Article III of the U.S. Constitution has been hardened by
the tests of time, to the point of becoming a deeply rooted institutional norm or
tradition that can no longer be blown away by the occasional gust of anti-court
sentiment.
At this core is a reservoir of public confidence in the courts, in which 76% of the
public expresses some or a great deal of confidence in the U.S. Supreme Court,
followed by 74% for federal courts and 71% for state courts. 49 Seventy-nine percent of
the public thinks that "dedicated to facts and law" describes judges well or very well,
while 75% says the same of "fair," 68% of "honest and trustworthy," and 62% of
"impartial." 50 And as previously noted, 73% thinks that judges should be shielded from
outside pressure,5 while 83% thinks that they should be protected from congressional
interference.
52
In short, what we have is a public that may be frustrated enough with particular
judges to be sympathetic to the complaints of skeptics who occupy layer four (hence
the 76% who think that judges are political and the 56% who think that judicial
activism has reached a crisis point), but that is not so angry or shaken as to second-
guess its core belief that judges are essentially fair and honest decision makers who are
devoted to resolving disputes with reference to the facts and law, and who should be
allowed to do their jobs free from threats or intimidation.
48. Id. at 6-10.
49. BELDEN RuSSONELLO & STEWART, supra note 31, at 16.
50. JUSTICE AT STAKE CAMPAIGN, supra note 38.
51. MAXWELL POLL, supra note 30.
52. BELDEN RUSSONELLO & STEWART, supra note 31.
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